

Domain Name System Security

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Objectives

- Provide DNS basics, essential for understanding DNS security
- Understand threats against DNS
- Provide examples of vulnerabilities and attacks
- Understand mechanisms in DNSSEC
- Understand effects of using DNSSEC
- Understand what can be done to improve security of DNS
- cover current status with DNSSEC deployment

Humans and Addresses

- Numeric addresses are used in the Internet
 - example: 10.0.0.1 (IPv4)
 - fe80::a0a1:46ff:fe06:61ee (IPv6)
- Humans are better at remembering names than numbers
- In the Internet, names have been used from the start on

History


- In the beginning ... there was the file **hosts**
 - mapping between “hostname” and address
- Internet grew, one file was not a scalable solution
- A more scalable and automated procedure was needed

The Solution...

- DNS (Domain Name System)
- Main tasks
 - mapping between names and IP addresses, and vice versa
 - controlling e-mail delivery
- But today DNS is used to store a lot of other data also
 - for example DNS SRV record
 - specifying the location of services

Basic Internet Infrastructure

- DNS is a fundamental component of the Internet infrastructure



Basic Characteristics (1/2)


- DNS is a database
- The three basic characteristics of the database:
 - 1) global
 - All the names need to be unique
 - 2) distributed
 - no node has complete information
 - an organisation can administer its own DNS information

Basic Characteristics (2/2)

- 3) Hierarchical
 - the data is arranged in a tree structure with a single root node
 - the structure is similar to the Unix file system structure

DNS Structure

The nodes are
called
domains



DNS Concepts (1/3)

- The servers are called name servers
 - name server “roles”
 - master (primary)
 - the name server where the data is administered
 - is the ultimate authority for the data (authoritative)
 - slave (secondary)
 - is authoritative for a zone
 - gets the data from the master through a zone transfer
 - cache
 - a name server can store data DNS data (that it is not authoritative for) for a while


DNS Concepts (2/3)

- The client is called a resolver
 - can do name queries
 - Typically implemented with library functions that applications use
 - nslookup (looking at DNS data), dig (for serious debugging)
- Name resolution
 - the process of acquiring some data, possible by performing several name queries
- The name servers need to know (“are booted up with”) the names and addresses of the root name servers (file root.cache)

DNS Concepts (3/3)


- Delegation
 - the authority for some sub-domain is given to another name server

Name resolution example



Zone vs. Domain

- Zone: a contiguous part of the DNS tree for which a name server has complete information



Resource Records

- The data in the DNS database is stored in entities called resource records
- The most common resource records:
 - A (name to address mapping)
 - PTR (address to name mapping)
 - MX (Mail Exchanger record)
 - NS: name server record
 - CNAME: name alias
 - SOA: Start of authority

Master Zone File Example

```
verkot.example. IN      SOA      ns.verkot.example.
    dnsadmin.verkot.example. (
        6 28800 7200 604800 86400 )
    IN      NS      ns.verkot.example.
    IN      MX      10 mail.verkot.example.
$ORIGIN verkot.example.
localhost IN      A      127.0.0.1
ns        IN      A      10.10.10.1
mail      IN      A      10.10.10.2
www       IN      A      10.10.10.3
          IN      TXT     "Our web server"
ftp       IN      CNAME   mail
```

Serial,
refresh,
retry,
expiry,
minimum
TTL

Error, dot
missing

DNS Today

- DNS has served its purpose well
- Internet is evolving, and new requirements have been issued
 - Support for IPv6
 - DNS security extensions
 - Vulnerabilities in DNS used in many attacks (like DNS spoofing)
 - security needed
 - DNS dynamic update
 - International DNS
 - Other new requirements

DNS Threats (1/2)

- Threats to the protocol
 - Packet Interception
 - Eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, DNS spoofing
 - ID guessing and Query Prediction
 - Predict resolver behavior and send a bogus response
 - Could be a blind attack
 - Name-based attacks
 - For example cache poisoning (using packet interception attacks)


DNS Threats (2/2)

- DOS attacks
- Issues with authenticating non-existence of a DNS name
- Wildcard handling issues
- DNSSEC weaknesses
- DNS Software vulnerabilities

DNS Vulnerabilities

- Crackers often start planning attacks by collecting DNS information
 - many organizations try to make this harder by prohibiting zone transfers and by using split DNS
- Crackers try to use DNS vulnerabilities
 - Both for direct attacks against DNS or for mounting further attacks

Manipulating DNS



DNS Spoofing

- Three ways to manipulate DNS
 - answer to queries with a false reply before the actual name server answers
 - cache poisoning: send false data to a recursive name server with a long TTL
 - the data is cached for a long time
 - compromise the DNS server
 - Using DNS software vulnerabilities

DOS Attacks using Name Servers

- Send a large number of DNS queries (using UDP) to a name server or several name servers (DDOS), using a spoofed IP address
 - responses will be sent to the spoofed IP address
 - the spoofed IP address is the victim
 - hard to trace because of the spoofed IP address
- the responses can be significantly larger than the queries
- DOS possibly both on victim machine and name server

BIND Vulnerabilities (1/3)

- Use the BIND vulnerabilities to compromise the DNS server machine
- often BIND is run as **superuser!!!!**
- Examples of vulnerabilities
 - RRSIG query handling bug in BIND 9.7.1 (July 2010)
 - Fix: upgrade
 - BIND 9 DNSSEC validation code could cause bogus NXDOMAIN responses (Jan 2010)
 - could impair the ability of DNSSEC to protect against a denial-of-service attack on a secure zone.
 - Fix: upgrade

BIND vulnerabilities (2/3)

- BIND Dynamic Update DoS (July 2009)
 - BIND denial of service (server crash) caused by receipt of a specific remote dynamic update message.
 - Fix: upgrade
- CERT VU#800113 DNS Cache Poisoning Issue (Aug 2008)
 - Fix: DNSSEC, Query Port Randomization for BIND 9 (upgrade)

BIND vulnerabilities (3/3)

- "BIND: Remote Execution of Code" (Nov 2002)
 - Versions affected: BIND 4.9.5 to 4.9.10, 8.1, 8.2 to 8.2.6, 8.3.0 to 8.3.3
 - SIG RR code bug
 - Consequence: possibility to execute arbitrary code
 - Fix: upgrade
- Up-to-date information on BIND vulnerabilities
 - <https://www.isc.org/advisories/bind>

Attack on the DNS InfraStructure

- Distributed DOS attack against the DNS root servers 6 February 2007
 - six of the 13 root servers were affected, two badly
 - the two servers affected badly did not use anycast
 - Anycast
 - spread the load on several servers in different locations
 - Also measures to block the packets part of the DDOS
 - the packets had a larger size than 512 bytes
 - If the root servers do not function, eventually name resolution will not work
 - in this case, fast reaction and a new technology (anycast) lead to limited impact on the actual Internet users

DNS Security (1/3)

- Main documents
 - DNS security extensions
 - New RFCs approved 2005
 - DNS Security Introduction and Requirements, RFC 4033
 - Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions, RFC 4034
 - Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions, RFC 4035
 - new RFC in 2006
 - Minimally Covering NSEC Records and DNSSEC On-line Signing, RFC 4470
 - Protection of queries and responses
 - Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG), RFC 2845
 - DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)s), RFC 2931
 - Secure Dynamic Update
 - Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update, RFC 3007
 - Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (CERT RR), RFC 4398
- A list of all documents related to DNSSEC can be found from:
 - <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dnsext/>

DNS Security (2/3)

- Security services:
 - Data origin authentication and integrity
 - including ability to prove non-existence of DNS data
 - Transaction and request authentication and integrity
 - Means for public key distribution

DNS Security (3/3)

- DNS security does not offer:
 - confidentiality
 - access control
 - but often the DNS server implementations do
 - protection against attacks on the name server node itself
 - protection against denial of service attacks
 - protection against misconfiguration

DNSSEC Security Extensions (1/9)

- Signature record (RRSIG)
 - a record containing a signature for a DNS RR
 - contains the following information
 - type of record signed
 - algorithm number
 - Labels Field
 - Original TTL
 - signature expiration and inception
 - Key tag
 - signer name
 - Signature
 - replaces SIG record

DNSSEC Security Extensions (2/9)

- Example

```
host.example.com. 86400 IN RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20030322173103 (
    20030220173103 2642 example.com.
    oJB1W6WNGv+ldvQ3WDG0MQkg5lEhjRip8WTr
    PYGv07h108dUKGMeDPKijVCHX3DDKdfb+v6o
    B9wfuh3DTJXUAfl/M0zmO/zz8bW0Rznl8O3t
    GNazPwQKkRN20XPXV6nwwfoXmJQbsLNrLfkG
    J5D6fwFm8nN+6pBzeDQfsS3Ap3o= )
```

DNSSEC Security Extensions

(3/9)

- DNSKEY record
 - Stores public keys that are intended for use in DNSSEC
 - contains the following fields
 - flags (indicating a zone key, public key used for TKEY)
 - the protocol (DNS, value 3)
 - the algorithm (RSA, DSA, private)
 - the public key
 - replaces KEY record

DNSSEC Security Extensions (4/9)

- Example

```
example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AQPSKmynfzW4kyBv015MUG2DeIQ3  
Cbl+BBZH4b/0PY1kxkmvHjcZc8no  
kfzj31GajlQKY+5CptLr3buXA10h  
WqTkF7H6RfoRqXQeogmMHfpftf6z  
Mv1LyBUgia7za6ZEzOJBOztyvhjL  
742iU/TpPSEDhm2SNKLijfUppn1U  
aNvv4w== )
```

DNSSEC Security Extensions (5/9)

- Delegation Signer record (DS)
 - Indicates which key(s) the child zone uses to sign its records.
 - Contains the following fields
 - Key tag
 - Algorithm
 - Digest type
 - Digest

DNSSEC Security Extensions (6/9)

- Example

dskey.example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
AQOeiiR0GOMYkDshWoSKz9Xz fwJr1AYtsmx3TGkJaNXVbfi/
2pHm822aJ5iI9BMzNXxeYcmZDRD99WYwYqUSdjMmmAphXdvxegXd/
M5+X7OrzKBaMbCVdFLUUh6DhweJBjEVv5f2wwjM9Xzc
nOf+EPbtG9DMBmADjFDc2w/rljwvFw==) ; key id = 60485

dskey.example.com. 86400 IN DS 60485 5 1 (
2BB183AF5F22588179A53B0A 98631FAD1A292118)

DNSSEC Security Extensions (7/9)

- NSEC record
 - data origin authentication of a non-existent name or record type
 - implies a canonical ordering of records
 - NSEC records are created automatically when doing the signing process
 - replaces NXT records

DNSSEC Security Extensions (8/9)

- Example:

ns	86400 IN	A	10.10.10.1
ns	86400 IN	NSEC	www.example.com. (A NSEC)
www	86400 IN	A	10.10.10.3


DNSSEC Security Extensions (9/9)

- CERT record
 - can contain different kinds of certificates (SPKI, PKIX X.509, PGP)
 - recommended to be stored under a domain named related to the subject of the certificate

Secure Name Resolution

- The resolver is statically configured with some keys (*key signing key*) it trusts
- the process involves verifying a chain of keys and signatures
 - a record retrieved will include a signature
 - the resolver needs to retrieve the corresponding *zone signing key* to be able to verify the signature
 - Verifications starts from the highest level RR and continues through a chain of verifications, until the zone signing key for the DNS data is verified
 - After that, the DNS data can be verified

Secure Name Resolution (Scenario)



Original Master Zone File

```
verkot.example.      IN      SOA      ns.verkot.example.
dnsadmin.verkot.example. (
                        6 28800 7200 604800 86400 )
                        IN      NS      ns.verkot.example.
                        IN      MX      10 mail.verkot.example.

$ORIGIN verkot.example.
localhost            IN      A      127.0.0.1
ns                   IN      A      10.10.10.1
mail                 IN      A      10.10.10.2
www                  IN      A      10.10.10.3
                     IN      TXT     "Our web server"
ftp                  IN      CNAME   mail
verkot.example. IN DNSKEY 256 3 5
AQOolPWnXoZXUI26cJmIWdNps+hes9uKt71+QzFiTc3FB3xIUPd+nyjB
hArle1HqckW4+hE8DtDI//zeVa90LEid2PvdP8Zy++tFZ7Zyhg1IKglc
TD8qA7DaqHa9Rwhtl9U=
```

Zone File after Signing (1/4)

```
; File written on Wed Sep 28 16:17:16 2005
; dnssec_signzone version 9.3.1
verkot.example.      86400      IN SOA      ns.verkot.example. dnsadmin.verkot.example.
                      (6        ; serial 28800      ; refresh (8 hours) 7200      ; retry (2 hours)
                      604800   ; expire (1 week) 86400      ; minimum (1 day))

86400      RRSIG      SOA 5 2 86400 20051028121716 (
20050928121716 23576 verkot.example.
VZ92OWwT7rK5Nj9yksqdsWJ3GaNGp8tNAL7Bs2Vb8uB1+XN+EPHP4uwIDK43JyzIV0Vj0FHt7hmj9bgws
u6A3Mp332D7k+DRFmhfgHMRdXeMxSGrP+IB89f2BknCyoXQ )
86400      NS         ns.verkot.example.
86400      RRSIG      NS 5 2 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576 verkot.example.

hXX6fGWcTI+q1NFWJznffkCYPg86wQyW7nwHcdKg0YF2FX57w12A1P9zUlxT8SJ5kJyAEAjBvaxbzKy3q
q3NiNq24vaaU0gjJFt7z+4ZgvVBjcGPq3owrIVX+ljlTCue )
86400      MX         10 mail.verkot.example.
86400      RRSIG      MX 5 2 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576 verkot.example.

RqOyunvHTO1Rbuc/HNMe35kXNddIHGrtMubjra7CdO5mDrOJlQicdy7YSuyFfeUdZrF0+px8gv0x0daZabP
73zMNW2nKIRtuwDhoNIZLK+op3ycurZ38BR2s79JqfHyD )
86400      NSEC       ftp.verkot.example. NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
86400      RRSIG      NSEC 5 2 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576 verkot.example.

Yi2YRyNpRCUujfWUt0TaG4zyHb1CTVr3BRXDU0JWvG9ECD6AYvpYpMrPUj4pN+qKa4v4MaXNaSKC4
XWsv8Hk/OJlf/BrgCK9OlRPMnPokSd/NSJYEGeTJol38TZOQYBf )
86400      DNSKEY     256 3 5
(AQQoIPWmXoZXUI26cJmIWDNps+hes9uKt71+QzFiTc3EB3xIUPd+nyjBhArle1HqcKW4+hE8DtDI//zeVa9
0LEid2PvdP8Zy++tFZ7Zyhg1lKglcTD8qA7DaqHa9Rwhtl9U=) ; key id = 23576
```

Zone File after Signing (2/4)

```
86400      RRSIG      DNSKEY 5 2 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576 verkot.example.
```

EYhRu2WPmgjo8O1JelgTGgVJvLpExihk8ZDMENyBp5Pl+/ioyFFnDeBbi7JtfIMGtzHL5oi7yhTVebH5SXZxsxu/Xg6wVD9G6nQlx/19XNqP5RqMOjA9+z5l8mlye386)

```
ftp.verkot.example.      86400      IN CNAME mail.verkot.example.
```

```
86400      RRSIG      CNAME 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576
```

verkot.example.

JlVILtqKls8Km78rAlInGb7uwLF6SQxl7WjXHem6LJ/R2nemrPfpYml0YNXdeVGOTv3n+mRZK4Z/yTySflxckTqk666X8WYIs
RMhwsvdljWHilj2u4eArbYcdCLeO33s)

```
86400      NSEC      localhost.verkot.example. CNAME RRSIG NSEC
```

```
86400      RRSIG      NSEC 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576
```

verkot.example.

J3DgodgZgvbnnvZBWzgdJ2qrWjHg19d88Mwj6LiRP+Z8n7xFa9km8Dh/YT+MUWv10nd5b9qOzVYMqmpZxJ7EVd0LgTp09V3lqz7Ki7pZcflzNhnLHc+03racm5lmHf12)

```
localhost.verkot.example. 86400      IN A      127.0.0.1
```

```
86400      RRSIG      A 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576
```

verkot.example.

Uq0P6qTaT2sxSbXqZwqyKNEBUXNS49zUPAJxdcdwukcO3FyQYb6ld269Q7XAhVPVgxXCYOupcU47vWrPhb9C+/ymRhEYFKi/zXt+pNVQyedVKtLtSgoLzcjsC7kbVXw)

```
86400      NSEC      mail.verkot.example. A RRSIG NSEC
```

```
86400      RRSIG      NSEC 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576
```

verkot.example.

M201N04BE0401bE3k97kOBhltlp4dnVCZUrTQSZFr/hBeizghSzh4CnX3NLAZdr3d55bNqGa75xPm+1Dg4igfQ/TZRK4p/OplgCZz
ggVIWbcTQkndifyHa8tF3mskekSii/)

Zone File after Signing (3/4)

mail.verkot.example. 86400 IN A 10.10.10.2
86400 RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576
verkot.example.

Nhk09ElqZAT/KOkfLtkf9S4lwl8dlxZHsDQFPuqRUP/riA8HAI1CzcBVZrZ19S8MNIJ6o22yFQp/0rzMfBnJD/0f0hL
o2kaz7Zcsapk+mXd7vsf9Fpi2HrRrdMFWP6nt)
86400 NSEC ns.verkot.example. A RRSIG NSEC
86400 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716
23576 verkot.example.

SxxQMF2soXT3gHrVV9TNEsA6zPXEIFGynZ7eFi4/vGm12tkKzA3BTpkImRrLHTrxWuFHvpvUQHxvCxaO8ad3
oP6NCHesl1ICENkuUsFW3MMo7uXNZa3t3VxwOljtVsw+)
ns.verkot.example. 86400 IN A 10.10.10.1
86400 RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (
20050928121716 23576 verkot.example.

dQIY/CTSUMBPKKxv1DcN1osbAuEpjt5SWmgZgLYx3kpVAk4aSuCGdOWCylRoQdRs/MRx62K6dHhyDy7qtA
yMM//NHwGUbnkrDoSurXsmDS2ud6JCfNyTCWJl+qK5MUKH)
86400 NSEC www.verkot.example. A RRSIG NSEC
86400 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716
23576 verkot.example.

Ik+ovY4k2CFyX3vEo66N0HUHNGLmv7h2a7T08E/4FocQgKXhAv8LU4tG+437IEYxwfKo9/j2w5E9cjb+oikTqWq
i3jPTD/Zi74wvVa1SHQR4ls6AMwE7DBdM1od3tSrY)

Zone File after Signing (4/4)

```
www.verkot.example.      86400      IN A          10.10.10.3
                          86400      RRSIG         A 5 3 86400 20051028121716 ( 20050928121716
23576 verkot.example.

bsxBpAxE7xw9uzV30kTjif7E6IMHHOsn17EZyDp+01dFR3zNv2Zcu6bvy+crnihJNzgzASeXYvnUq4JaJk0U0q
GTDJSIEiDfti/XzflYH3sqDFjw1Yw+ykp4x+gwXOk6 )

                          86400      TXT          "Our web server"
                          86400      RRSIG         TXT 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (      20050928121716 23576
verkot.example.

Spxg5Jly7vMK8co6hgFng1rISRZENhxD27jGPxOtH7wjd7wuuktvI2sNgkBo2dtNuAPVdh256jRe9Eo8xd3cP2
MG//NzLjhL05coelgKEpThHQ6orT2WE0FbN/FNxLW )

                          86400      NSEC          verkot.example. A TXT RRSIG NSEC
                          86400      RRSIG         NSEC 5 3 86400 20051028121716 (20050928121716 23576
verkot.example.

mgO9FlagQqRCmsGbKnBizkxHxUizPv79gclAl1eaoSAAFwciTWQpJ4hqrcE9MgS67K0qK/aouoLiNct966GlvK
uk41HEIXaDDoCBQ2YJ+zA9      n9CGqRiO4NRY++eKN5AA )
```

Implications of the Security Extensions (1/2)

- the record number in the database grows roughly by a factor of three (NSEC, RRSIG records needed)
 - New records have a large size, so the actual database grows even more.
- NSEC records make it possible to list the complete contents of the zone (effectively do a zone transfer)
 - Some ideas
 - Minimally Covering NSEC Records and DNSSEC On-line Signing, RFC 4470
 - DNSSEC Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence, RFC 5155

Implications of the Security Extensions (2/2)

- DNS UDP packets are limited to the size of 512 (RFC 1035)
 - answer packets including required signature records might exceed the limit
 - IPv6 support also increases DNS message sizes
 - Extension mechanism for DNS (EDNS, RFC2671) provides a solution
 - EDNS must be supported in DNSSEC

Transaction and Request Authentication and Integrity

- Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
 - symmetric encryption
 - covers a complete DNS message with a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
 - signature calculation and verification relatively simple and inexpensive
- DNS Request and transaction signatures (SIG (0))
 - public key encryption, sign the message
 - offers scalability

DNS Dynamic Updates (1/2)

- Authorized clients or servers can dynamically update the zone data
 - zones can not be created or deleted
- example

prereq nxrrset www.example.com A

prereq nxrrset www.example.com CNAME

update add www.example.com 3600 CNAME test.example.com

DNS Dynamic Updates (2/2)

- Example of use
 - mechanism to automate network configuration even further
 - a DHCP server can update the DNS after it has granted a client a lease for an IP address
 - Can be protected with transaction protection methods
 - Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG), RFC 2845
 - DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)s), RFC 2931

TKEY RR

- TKEY record
 - can be used for establishing a shared secret between the server and the resolver
 - negotiate a shared secret using Diffie-Hellman
 - Authentication using public keys (SIG (0)) or a previously established shared secret
 - The resolver or server generates the key and encrypts it with the server or resolver public key
 - meta-RR, not present in any master zone files or caches

DNSSEC Issues (1/2)

- DNSSEC is complex
- Significant increase of response packets
- Signature validation increases work load and thus increases response time
- Hierarchical trust model
- Key rollover at the root and TLD name servers
 - for example .com contains millions of RRs
- Strict time synchronization needed

DNSSEC Issues (2/2)

- TSIG
 - Keys need to be online
 - Fine grained authorization not possible
- Many workshops have been held to progress DNSSEC
 - Number of open issues decreasing
- Not much real deployment yet
 - Some secure islands exist
 - TSIG more common

Internationalized DNS (IDN)

- DNS originally designed to work with ASCII as the character set
- Internationalized DNS aims to provide support for other character sets.
 - An encoding from other character sets to ASCII is needed

Security Problems in Internationalized DNS (IDN)

- Phishing concerns known related to IDN
 - Idea: use a different characters set where a name looks the same, but translates to an entirely different domain name
 - Example: `http://www.pàypal.com` instead of `www.paypal.com`
- No technical solution has been found to the problems

DNS as a PKI? (1/3)

- Public keys of an entity can be stored under its domain name
 - not intended for personal keys
- DNS can be used to store certificates (CERT record)
 - can include personal keys

DNS as a PKI? (2/3)

- the public key or certificate will be bound to a domain name
 - search for a public key or a certificate must be performed on basis of the domain name
 - a convenient naming convention needs to be used
 - an efficient search algorithm is required

DNS as a PKI? (3/3)

- research on DNS as a certificate repository can be found from the Tessa project at Helsinki University of Technology
 - <http://www.tml.tkk.fi/Research/TeSSA/>

Conclusions: how to handle DNS Security (1/4)

- Basic security **first!**
 - Run latest version of the name server
 - Firewall protection
 - Don't run any other services on the machine
 - Run as non-root
 - Run in a sandbox: chroot environment (“jail”)
 - Eliminate single points of failure
 - Redundancy, run at least two name servers
 - Put name servers in separate sub-networks and behind separate routers

Conclusions: how to handle DNS Security (2/4)

- Basic security (cont.)
 - Consider non-recursive behavior and restricting queries
 - To mitigate against cache poisoning
 - Use random message Ids
 - Hide version number
 - Prevent unauthorized zone transfer
 - TSIG can be used to authenticate zone transfers
 - Restrict DNS dynamic updates
 - TSIG can be used to authenticate dynamic updates

Conclusions: how to handle DNS Security (3/4)

- Split DNS (internal/external)
 - Useful when using private addresses in the internal network
 - Enhances overall security of the network, as only some nodes can connect to the external network directly
 - Firewalls between external and internal network
 - External DNS servers in the DMZ
 - Internal DNS servers in the internal network

Conclusions: how to handle DNS Security (4/4)

- Additional security measures
 - Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
 - Can be used to ensure authentication and integrity for queries, responses, zone transfers, dynamic updates
 - The communication parties need a shared secret
 - Good performance
 - DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
 - Public-key methods
 - Provides scalability but bad performance
- Security is a process
 - Monitor CERT and similar organizations, monitor relevant mailing lists

DNSSEC Deployment (1/2)

- DNSSEC deployment has started
 - <https://www.dnssec-deployment.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/TLD-deployment-Table1.pdf>
 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Internet_top-level_domains
 - the root is signed
 - biz, edu, museum, org are signed
 - ietf.org, iab.org, icann.org, isoc.org are also signed
 - iana.org and .arpa are almost signed
 - se has been signed for a long time (pioneer)
 - other TLDs that are signed
 - bg, br, ch, cz, dk, fi, jp, kr, li, lk, na, pr, pt, sg, th, tm

DNSSEC Deployment (2/2)

- .gov has mandated signing for children
(<http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/>)
 - some experiences
 - » Key Signing Key rollover issues
 - » Timing issues (for example expired signatures)
 - » name server that are not DNSSEC capable have been run with signed zones

Some interesting books and links

- Cricket Liu, Paul Albitz, DNS & BIND
 - **the** DNS book
- <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dnsext/>
- <http://www.isc.org/>
- www.menandmice.com
- <http://www.dnssec-deployment.org>
- <http://www.dnssec.net/>